Social Exclusion and Capability by Salais, Robert
Social Exclusion and Capability
Robert Salais
To cite this version:
Robert Salais. Social Exclusion and Capability. Marginalisation and Social Exclusion, May
2003, Alesund, Norway. <halshs-00430491>
HAL Id: halshs-00430491
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00430491
Submitted on 7 Nov 2009
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Institutions et Dynamiques Historiques de l'Economie 
Unité mixte de recherche n° 8533 du CNRS 
 
DOCUMENTS DE TRAVAIL 
SERIE REGLES, INSTITUTIONS, CONVENTIONS 
N° 07-01 
Janvier 2007 
 
 
 
Social Exclusion and Capability 
Robert Salais 
(IDHE, Cachan et WZB, Berlin) 
 
 
 
Lecture delivered at the International Research Conference Marginalisation and Social 
Exclusion, Alesund, Norway, May 21-23, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IDHE – Ecole normale supérieure de Cachan 
61, avenue du Président Wilson  F - 94235 Cachan cedex – 
Téléphone 33 (0)1 47 40 68 40 Télécopie 33 (0)1 47 40 68 42 
http://www.idhe.ens-cachan.fr 
 2
 
 
 
 
In his paper on social exclusion for the Asian Development Bank (Sen, 2000), Amartya Sen 
mentions that the term “social exclusion” is of recent origin. He gives credit to the French 
policy maker Remy Lenoir of being the author of the expression in the mid seventies. But he 
also mentions that the term has become an umbrella concept under which a wide range of 
social and economic problems have been loosely sheltered. Remy Lenoir, for instance, spoke 
of the following as constituting the “excluded”: “mentally and physically handicapped, 
suicidal people, aged invalids, abused children, substance abusers, delinquents, social parents, 
multi-problem households, marginal, asocial persons, and other social misfits”. To speak of 
social exclusion requires clarification. Amartya Sen argues that one can appreciate more fully 
the new literature on social exclusion by placing it in the broader concept of “the old –very 
aged- idea of poverty as capability deprivation”. I totally agree with a line of research 
focussing on people’s capabilities and I would like to suggest you to read this Sen’s paper.  
 
However, in my conference I will follow a slightly (but modestly) different path. I will 
consider that social exclusion is qualitatively different from what is usually considered as 
poverty. I will emphasise that, to be politically addressed, social exclusion, and not poverty, 
has to be understood as capability deprivation. There are at least three reasons for such a 
choice. Firstly, too often poverty is implicitly understood as monetary poverty, which is not 
simply the case for social exclusion. Secondly, one can no longer think of and act on social 
issues as if the reality of the problems to deal with had not been constructed by half a century 
or more of social policies. Historically, it is true that the ‘social question’ in our countries − in 
other words the threat to the established order created by the fact that underprivileged social 
classes do not have access to the full range of society's resources − was first tackled as the 
‘fight against poverty’. However, since a long time, social policies have been sophisticated 
and instituted to deal with several specific social risks like unemployment, old age, illness, 
family and so on. Poverty has not, of course, disappeared, but has taken new social forms, 
partly as a by-product of these policies. So I am not sure that we have anything to gain in 
putting new wine in the old bottle of poverty. Thirdly, the realities that lead to welfare state 
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intervention cannot be considered independently of the social categorisations used by these 
policies and their shaping of expectations and behaviours as a consequence. These 
categorisations are linked to normative models about what is fair to do for the state. Each 
normative model leads to select what information is relevant on people needing help and this 
creates social effects. 
 
The section 1 illustrates the “new facts”, labelled as social exclusion, and the need to 
reinterpret social policies as informational bases on social justice. Section 2 presents the 
capability approach in the line of Sen’s works. Section 3 develops some methodological 
issues about collecting relevant information on capabilities. 
 
I. Social exclusion and informational basis on social justice. An illustration 
 
There have always been people in social difficulties. What is new today – and this properly 
constitutes “social exclusion” - is that existing social policies prove to be irrelevant to deal 
with such people, at least with a significant part of their problems. In such a perspective, one 
can say that excluded people are those who slip through the nets of existing social protection 
systems, whatever complex these systems have become. Either the solutions that they find in 
those systems or schemes are inadequate to their situation, or they do not fulfil their criteria of 
selection and of eligibility. Or if by chance they are eligible, they do not claim for their rights 
and do not use the facilities offered. Being and doing so, such persons hurt the current 
expectations that we, as citizens, have about the efficiency and completeness of our systems 
of social protection. Hence the social and political visibility of those persons, who appear at 
times and in situations where nobody should have been normally expected. Generally 
speaking, social exclusion is symptomatic of some raising problems and issues to which the 
social protection systems of our developed countries (especially in Europe) are confronted. 
 
To illustrate the “new facts” not grasped with established social categorisation, let me take an 
example1 transposed from a Sen’s short story (Sen, 1999, 54-55) (see Table 1). 
                                                 
1
 The example has been suggested to me by Nicolas Farvaque (2003). I also have gratefully benefited from the 
survey on Sen’s works that he has undertaken.  
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Table 1. Worlds of welfare state as ex ante evaluation of persons 
 
 
Person Social 
identification 
Relevant 
information 
World of 
welfare state 
Problems to 
solve 
     
A  
Poor 
Household and 
individual 
income 
 
Liberal 
 
Poverty trap 
     
B Having worked 
hard all his/her 
life 
Work 
career 
 
Continental 
Lack of work 
competencies 
     
C Ill person 
without any 
ambition 
 
Qualify of life 
 
Nordic 
Social 
dependency 
 
 
 
What about D, no income, a life of bad jobs, severe conditions of life and health and no 
personal agency? 
 
 
The owner of a domain would like to recruit somebody to maintain her garden. Three persons 
(respectively A, B and C) respond to the offer, each of them seeming adequate to do the job. 
However the owner who makes effort to act with fairness and social justice is preoccupied. 
She would like to make a good choice, that is a choice that obeys to her sense of justice (in 
other words, to some normative model, acknowledged to be so in the society in which she 
lives). The problem is that there are three available models, which focuses on specific 
information and lets apart other information as irrelevant. Each set of information constitutes 
a “territory of justice” (Sen, 1990, 111): “The informational basis of a judgement identifies 
the information on which the judgement is directly dependent and – no less important – 
asserts that the truth or falsehood of any other type of information cannot directly influence 
the correctness of the judgement. The informational basis of judgement on justice (IBJJ) thus 
determines the factual territory over which considerations of justice directly apply”. This basis 
delineates what data count to make a fair judgement about the situation of the person at stake. 
It basis also contributes to define the type of help and the way to provide it. With regard to 
state action, this basis is both foundational and pragmatic (Sen, 1999a, 86). 
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The problem again is that there are several possible informational bases and territories of 
justice. The person A is the poorest. And it will happen that, if not recruited, A and his family 
have no income. What is more important than to help needy people, asks the owner to herself? 
However, after scrutiny, B appears the most deserving person. He has worked hard all his life 
in unskilled jobs and has been, one year ago, fired out in a collective redundancy. Due to old 
age, his chances to find a job are very thin. What is better than helping people who proved to 
have actively participated to the life of community and contributed to its wealth? Interviewing 
C, the owner becomes aware that C is very ill and spends most of his money in drugs, medical 
exams and treatments. C has lost any ambition and has no expectations and projects for the 
future. Would not be fairer to give the job to C? This will help him to improve the quality of 
his life and to find again some meaning to it. 
 
Let us for a while the owner with her embarrassment and come back to our issues. Situations 
A, B and C are examples of three modes of selecting information in welfare policies. Of 
course, all the three persons have some income, some past work experience; each has some 
conditions of life, private (housing, transport, health, family responsibilities, …) and social 
(participation to the life of the community). However, the relevant information is selected 
through the normative model that defines the criteria of what is good and just. If one looks at 
the corresponding general models or “worlds of welfare state” (as popularised by Esping-
Andersen, 1990), it is easy to connect A with the liberal poverty-oriented welfare state, B with 
the continental work-oriented welfare state and C to the Scandinavian quality-of-life welfare 
state. Each world founds its mode of evaluation and type of action on a specific IBJJ. Doing 
so, it constructs the state of the person (A, B or C), both empirically and normatively in a 
special way.  
 
Furthermore, if the treatment happens to be inefficient and create “perverse effects”, problems 
to solve are conceived as arising, above all: from poverty trap for the liberal model; from lack 
of work competencies for the continental model; from social dependency for the nordic 
model. Policy adjustments are searched for along these lines of reflection. For instance, the 
French government has very recently decided to complete the RMI (Revenu Minimum 
d’Insertion) with the RMA (Revenu Minimum d’Activité). The RMI, created in 1989, is a 
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major scheme for struggling against social exclusion (more than one million of beneficiaries 
today). It consists of a monetary allowance, roughly half the minimum wage, provided to 
people in difficulties with very low income. Its provision is delivered by local committees. 
These committees are composed by the representatives of the administrations concerned by 
exclusion, of associations (non-profit and voluntary organisations) and of elected 
municipalities. In the rebuilt scheme, long term RMI beneficiaries that are recruited by an 
employer into halftime tasks through a special contract will receive this RMA (approximately 
of the same amount) in replacement of their previous RMI. Even if monetary incentives are 
given to beneficiaries and to employers to favour a deal, it is not so much to solve a poverty 
trap than to create work experiences. People are supposed to have better chances to find a job 
in the future after this work experience.  
 
I will come back to these valuation aspects in the next sections. Imagine now that a fourth 
person D knocks at the door of our owner. Investigation reveals that D has presently no 
income, that her only work experience has always been bad jobs for short and interrupted 
periods, that she has severe conditions of life and health (no decent housing, living in a 
stigmatised neighbouring, several diseases, etc.). And, ultimately, that D has lost any feeling 
of what could be a personal agency. At first glance, it could seem to the owner that D has 
priority over A, B and C and that she should be chosen. Because, D formally and 
simultaneously satisfies the criteria of the three underlining models of social justice and 
welfare provision. Nevertheless it would be immediately evident for any observer and for the 
owner that to choose her will not be a solution for her problems. D is not correctly identified, 
nor fairly evaluated by any of the three worlds of welfare and their general categories. She is 
not simply poor, or lacking of work competencies or having bad conditions of life. All these 
deficiencies interact at a personal level in a kind of vicious circle. Using standard information 
and solution for one issue will not improve any of them. Situation of D with its singularity is 
precisely the case for which an approach in terms of capability deprivation can be both fair 
and efficient.  
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II. Sen and the capability approach 
 
In order to be brief, I make the assumption that you know something about Sen’s works. I will 
first try to focus on what in his works is especially relevant for social exclusion issues. I will 
then list the facts that plead in favour of apprehending social exclusion as capability 
deprivation and, finally, suggest that a capability approach is, above all, a practical 
methodology. 
 
 2.1. The theoretical framework  
 
The core concepts of the capability approach need to be recalled: functionings, effective (or 
substantial) freedom to achieve and capabilities. These concepts are interdependent. The best 
is to quote Amartya Sen himself.  
 
1. “Functionings represent parts of the state of a person – in particular the various things 
that he or she manages to do or be in leading a life” (Sen, 1993: 31). Functionings are not 
objects detached of the person; they are doings or beings, the achievements of which (or, 
alternatively, the freedom to achieve) are valued by the person. To evaluate the well-being 
of a person requires to evaluate to what extent she has achieved (or has the effective 
freedom to achieve) the functionings she values. If one takes the example of D and 
considers her concrete situation, the functionings she could be presumed to value are, at 
least, some basic functionings like good health, good housing, a decent wage. For an 
external observer, D objectively needs the achievement of such functionings, not to speak 
of other immaterial and equally important functionings like participating to the life of 
some community, dignity or self-respect. 
2. “The capability of a person reflects the alternative combinations of functionings the 
person can achieve, and from which he or she can choose a collection” (Sen, 1993: 31). 
For Sen the metrics of capabilities is the right metrics for judging individual advantage 
and, beyond, to evaluate inequality within a given society. Such an evaluation is 
intermediary between evaluation in terms of outcomes (such as wealth, income, basket of 
commodities, utility or preferences) and evaluation in terms of primary goods or means 
(see scheme 1). There is a huge theoretical debate on these issues in economics. I would 
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not present this debate except to say that Sen gives priority and antecedence to empirical 
evidence over normative justification. It could be the case that, globally speaking, the 
market is the optimal design to build social institutions and that, in a market perspective, 
what people deserving help only need are means-tested monetary benefits. Nevertheless 
empirical evidence shows that, when faced by the same hazard, people are unequal in their 
possibilities to overcome it and in access to effective opportunities. Beyond normative 
choice, what is crucial is the unequal rate of conversion of given means into desirable 
outcomes. The evidence is not simply inequality of means (or resources), but inequality of 
capabilities between people. And this evidence is of prime importance in implementing 
public policies. For instance, for the disabled to attain equality in access to transportation, 
it is objectively better to ensure that means of public transport be fitted with especially 
designed entrance doors. Because the power to convert monetary benefits into the 
functioning “transport” is lower for the disabled than for the able. It would not be fair, nor 
efficient to provide the disabled only with cash. 
 
To struggle against inequality of capabilities is the true problem for social policies. It is 
not to militate in favour of the normative model one believes to be the best. 
 
3. It follows from (1) and (2) that effective freedom to be and to do (and the scope of this 
freedom) is essential for judging the capabilities of a person. A capability approach to 
welfare takes into account both the achievements and the freedom to achieve. An achieved 
functioning (for instance to be fed) that has been obtained by obliging a person to take 
food risks to be of no value, for the person has no freedom to choose between taking or 
not taking food. What ultimately counts is access to effective freedom and, beyond, to 
reflexive learning of his or her possibilities to act by himself. A right appreciation on these 
matters is not of course easy. Many situations are source of dilemmas. Judgement requires 
prudence and openness to unpredictable circumstances. By obliging the person to take 
food in urgency, it is likely that she has been saved from death. However, to develop her 
capabilities, it would have been preferable in addition to create around her a material and 
immaterial environment that provides (non monetary) incentives to be able to choose, an 
environment that generates a virtuous dynamics over time. 
 
 9
Scheme 1. Capabilities as operational mediation 
between means and valuable outcomes 
 
 
Evaluating the state of the person 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social exclusion as capability deprivation is thus, for one part, the lack of basic functionings, 
material such as being correctly fed, housed, educated, having a decent job, or immaterial 
such as having social relations, voting, etc. It is, for the other part, the lack of effective 
freedom to choose and to act in the circumstances where the person is staying. These two 
parts are really non separable. If one of them is absent, the person continues to suffer from 
capability deprivation. For, in Sen’s views, the ultimate target is to provide the person with 
autonomy of development and possibility to reflexivity and self-responsibility. 
 
With regards to the lack of any personal agency for most of excluded people, access to 
effective freedom is key in social exclusion issues. If our previous owner offers to D a free 
housing simply by charity, there is danger that D develops a greater social dependency. 
Saving D from house need is obviously good. But in itself it would not necessarily save her 
durably, except if this first action is followed by a process providing D with capabilities. 
Studies on the homeless (Labbens and Oberti in Paugam, 1996) highlight the value of dignity, 
or in a negative form, the shame that is attached to the nature of housing. Shelter in 
emergency housing (Raveaud, 2000) affords inhabitants a level of comfort which often they 
had not known before, and they are well aware of this. But it does not necessarily provide 
Capabilities and 
Deliberation 
procedures 
Public means 
(schemes, legislation, 
rights) 
Achievement of 
valuable outcomes 
 10
self-respect, one of the fundamental aspects of inclusion. Sometimes the residents of 
emergency houses are reluctant to give out their address, which is too easily recognised, in 
particular by the potential employers.  
 
I have recalled, above, the current debate in France on prolonging RMI by RMA. Voluntary 
organisations in charge of RMI beneficiaries underline the distance from work for many of 
these beneficiaries in terms of inability to develop effective freedom, even to satisfy basic 
needs like health. A witness among others: “He was out of reality when we recuperated him. 
He had even forgotten that he was receiving the RMI; the money was sleeping in a bank 
count, probably opened by a social worker for him. Four years were necessary to convince 
him to go to take tooth caring”2. Voluntary organisations insist on the need to calibrate and to 
combine cash and services in kind very carefully both individually and in-process (that is 
along the process of inclusion). If it is not the case, people will be obliged to take 
responsibilities they cannot assume and to be unfairly penalised. “It is good to put the accent 
on professional inclusion, but people far from the world of work risk to be unable to satisfy 
the obligations generated by the RMA inclusion contract and to lose their allowance”3. If so, 
the RMA scheme in France would lead to the opposite of the outcome searched for. The a 
priori less capable persons will be excluded, even from the provision of minimum income, 
instead of entering a process of acquiring capabilities. Such adverse selection is unfortunately 
at work in a number of the schemes supposed to help people to be included. Only the best 
capable are selected at the entrance of schemes, which reproduces exclusion. 
 
 2.2. Empirical observation and capability deprivation 
 
Empirical observation pleads in favour of apprehending social exclusion as capability 
deprivation. Four points are worth to be quoted4. 
a. Even if social exclusion can be said as relative when looking at the availability 
on goods or services or income people have, it has an absolute dimension in terms of 
capabilities. This is its major and qualitative difference from poverty as classically 
                                                 
2
 Association Solidarité-Accueil, Châteauroux, in Le Monde, 7 May 2003.  
3
 Bruno Grouès, Uniopss, in Le Monde, 7 May 2003. 
4
 For some developements, Raveaud and Salais, 2002 . 
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understood (see the debate between Townsend and Sen in the 1980s5). Many studies6 
reveal that the number and quality of available commodities or services are very low 
for people and households at the bottom of income distributions. However, the true 
question is to have or to have not the capability to achieve the corresponding 
functionings. For instance, a RMI beneficiary (or a long-term unemployed or a 
disabled person or a young under 25 in social difficulties) could be accepted in a job, 
in particular when local employers have a sense of ethics; however, very often he or 
she will not have the capability to stay in it; more than some days or hours. Knowing 
these facts, local agencies or voluntary organisations are reluctant to provide 
employers with people whose they have some doubts on such a capability. Even if 
they are pressed by their hierarchy to improve the figures and their quantitative 
performance, the staffs responsible at local levels, if they value their missions, cannot 
work (and have a good self-evaluation) without having intuition of this absoluteness 
(Farvaque, 2000 ; Martinon, 2002). 
b. Very often lacks of achieved functionings are correlated and interact in a 
negative way. Access to one of them conditions access to others. For instance, as 
underlined above, housing conditions can vary in quality, but living in some housing 
or neighbourhood or address can lead to an absolute deprivation in terms of labour 
market access. Reciprocally the inability to find and keep a decent job can prevent to 
find good housing conditions. Thus there is a great need to solve the problems 
progressively and in a coherent way, in particular in beginning by the most important 
one that crucially determines future possibilities. Even when the ultimate goal is return 
to job, the primary condition can be health improvement or the recovering of regular 
habits. This has to be dealt with, first. 
c. Social exclusion is marked with unpredictability. Something happens in the life 
of the person or her family that was impossible to predict: a private accident; a 
professional injury; a job loss due to economic conditions; a health disease. Individual 
biographies and life stories of excluded people are full of these unpredictable 
incidents. Often judged as minor at their beginning, these incidents prove to have 
major consequences that are quickly out of individual control. This constitutes one of 
the reasons for which persons slip through the standard welfare systems or programs. 
                                                 
5
 Sen, 1983 and Townsend, 1985.   
6
 For instance, by using ECHP data. 
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d. Absoluteness, interaction and unpredictability, all converge toward the 
requirement that the relevant features of social exclusion (relevant in that only them 
can help to define an efficient and fair solution) have to be grasped at the level of the 
person in cause. This could be viewed as a rather demanding requirement. The 
combination of detailed investigation and respect of the person may be hard to 
manage. However, objective evaluation of the state of the person corresponds to the 
priority of inquiry over normative justification upon which Sen insists. Evaluation has 
to be situated, what means to focus on the relevant features of the personal situation to 
deal with. This is not to say that such evaluation is difficult per se or unpractical. Each 
situation under review requires a careful judgement, in which all relevant facts are 
produced, confronted and weighted. One can say that such evaluation tries to select the 
information susceptible of delineating around each person this “territory of justice” or 
IBJJ that we spoke above. Information can use general categories or, most often, 
idiosyncratic knowledge of the person, its past, character, problems and projects and 
so on. As Sen (1996) recalls, collective deliberation can be necessary as well as 
participation of potential recipients in order to produce a fair balanced judgement. 
 
To conclude this section, I would like to emphasise that these requirements to implement a 
capability approach are in no way utopian. The practical operation of French schemes, like the 
RMI (Astier, 1997) or inclusion policies for young people in difficulties (Farvaque and Salais, 
2002), both implemented at a local level, share some features close to a capability approach. 
Their origin, philosophy and context have no inspiration in Sen’s works; they belong to the 
French tradition of social rights. However one can say that they share the same “capability 
intuition”. For instance, at least for those (one third) who benefit from an “insertion contract”, 
the RMI is more than a means-tested allowance. In fact it is qualitatively different from such 
allowances. Local committees that deliver the RMI work through collective deliberation, 
using in general a lot of information, general, local and personal, recipients’ interviews 
included.  Though a zone of uncertainty always remains, the quest seems less to detect the 
potential cheaters than to appreciate to what extent the state of the person in cause responds to 
the practical philosophy of the scheme. As to be provided is a right guaranteed by law, the 
deliberation is, in general, seriously lead, arguments weighted one against the other, and the 
ex ante presumption not unfavourable. People (or organisations that help them) can contest 
negative decisions in courts of justice. This possibility, of course, does not impede negative 
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decisions, but requires tight argumentation. As Astier, 1997, shows,  meetings of local 
committees also serve to provide recipients with advice and recommendation to do this or that 
(for instance, to go to the local agency for employment, to take care of his health, …). In its 
next meetings, the committee can verify whether its recommendation has been executed.  
 
 2.3. The capability approach as a practical methodology7 
 
The preceding remarks suggest that a capability approach does not directly lead to optimal 
design of schemes, programs or policies. It does not belong to a constructivist approach to 
institutions. It has to do with such objectives, of course. A capability approach would 
recommend some types of rules or procedures more than others, such as implementation at 
local levels, deliberating committees for providing help; participation of the potential 
recipients; not to focus exclusively on means, but also on the apprenticeship by recipients of 
effective freedom, of reflexivity and progressive responsibility; in-process calibration of help. 
The foundation of schemes on enforceable individual rights seems also guarantee some 
minimum democratisation. This is far from being negligible.  
 
However, a capability approach is, above all, a practical methodology that should be in use in 
every social scheme, program or policy. It draws attention to the fact that people threatened 
by social exclusion can exist apart from the schemes and policies officially designed to deal 
with this issue. Maybe more potentially excluded persons are out than in specialised schemes, 
for instance people registered into employment agencies, or into various social and medical 
schemes. In other words, in my view a capability approach cannot be used to justify and 
create, through institutionalisation, a general and substantial category of “exclusion” (as it has 
historically be done for unemployment or old age retirement). Exclusion has become a social 
question, but it concerns periods of life of persons whose destiny is, by no ways, to stay into 
exclusion and to be socially labelled as such. Policies must avoid routine, vertical hierarchy 
and standardisation as far as possible. These are key conditions for maintaining autonomy, 
innovation and democracy. 
 
                                                 
7
 More is said in Salais and Villeneuve (2004). 
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A capability approach will plead for using existing schemes and systems in an innovative 
way; for instance by overcoming institutional barriers between specialised agencies; by 
creating horizontal links at local level between administrations, social workers, associations 
and other organisations, municipalities; by leaving room to local adaptations of general 
schemes; by authorising “flexibility” (i.e. the possibility to indifferently use at a local level 
several types of measures within a global funding, in order to better cope with local 
peculiarities); by making social practitioners aware of what they are truly doing. If politically 
engaged, a capability approach will help to break the barriers between normatively-based 
systems of social protection, like the three well-known worlds of welfare state I used in my 
beginning story. More than a planned political strategy coming up from the top, it should 
constitute a collective movement and commitment that should involve all actors concerned at 
all levels. By such a way, a process of learning and acquiring experience could possibly 
develop and result in reforms of existing schemes.  
 
The last issue I will develop, but not the least, is about the status of information to collect on 
the capabilities of the persons. While specific, this issue has nevertheless close links with 
policy and implementation. Objectivity and justice are common requirements to all these 
issues.  
 
III. Collecting information on capabilities 
 
Collecting information on the persons to be helped and on their situation is crucial in a 
capability approach. As I recalled, priority should be given on objectivity over normative 
justification. This requirement applies to the provision of help, to its combination between 
material and immaterial types of help as well as to its duration and in-process calibration. 
What are the functionings that the person at stake, given her situation, can achieve or have 
achieved, and to what degree with regards to some individual or general reference? Looking 
at this set of achieved or attainable functionings allows to appreciate the capability of the 
person. The ultimate criterion of evaluation is the scope of effective freedom he or she can 
develop “to lead the life he or she has reason to value”.  
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Empirical and methodologically-funded facts are all the more important as public policies and 
collective investments are expected to develop capabilities and effective freedom. Sen 
(1985b: 208) underlines that two conceptions of freedom exist: individual control on choice; 
effective power to do and to be. Political philosophy has been mainly concerned with the 
latter (which focuses on how individual choices are made). Sen is more in favour of the 
former (effective power). No matter how the choice is made, the important thing is that the 
person has the power to do and to be. This second conception of freedom opens the route for 
substantial public policies. Public policies are then conceived as creating a material and 
immaterial social environment that provides people with effective power (in other terms 
capabilities). “A person’s ability to achieve various valuable functionings may be greatly 
enhanced by public action and policy, and these expansions of capability are not unimportant 
for freedom for that reason” (Sen, 1993: 44). For instance, there are two ways to live in a 
disease-free environment8. One way is to give to individuals the possibility to choose to stay 
or to start away from the disease environment, with regards to their preferences or utilities; 
the other one is to lead public policies eradicating the disease. People have then the power to 
live in a disease-free environment, though they have not explicitly choose it. This can be said 
a counterfactual conception of freedom.  
 
However, observation cannot be separated from evaluation. Observation requires selection of 
what is relevant to observe and of what is not. Functionings to observe are those that can be 
considered as valuable. It would be, for instance, irrelevant and even ridiculous to ask to 
households what kind of wash powder they use when the issue is to improve public policies 
with regards to health and live conditions. In a society where wash powder is of general use, 
capabilities and effective freedom have no link with brands of powder9. Things can be 
different in a society and at a time when wash powder is just appearing. Households (in 
particular women and, perhaps, men) who have access to it (in correlation with the use of 
wash machines) can be presumed having more capabilities than the others. When they focus 
on the person’s capabilities, both policy makers and researchers are confronted to the 
selection of the valuable functionings, largely in the same way.  
 
                                                 
8
 Sen’s example is malaria. 
9
 An example taken from Sen, 1992 : 71.  
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This selection problem has two faces, a collective one and an individual one.  
 
For a society as a whole, establishing the list of valuable functionings  (or at least having such 
a perspective debated) is essential. It is important to determine the domains where the state (or 
some collective agency) acknowledges its collective responsibility to substantially act in 
direction of the corresponding issues. Policies struggling against social exclusion need this 
kind of list, which serves as a benchmark for implementing inquiries, measures, decisions for 
help. More than a list per se, the ultimate objective seems to install and to legitimate some 
IBJJ on social exclusion that meets consensus and helps mutual expectations about what has 
to be done.  
 
But selecting relevant information has also an individual face. Capabilities evaluation at an 
individual level must bring (in Sen’s words) on “the life he or she has reason to live”. From 
the point of view of a public evaluator (call him E), it is not sure that all the facets of the life 
chosen by the person (call her P) deserve help. This evaluator is, by definition, an external 
evaluator; it has to value functionings with objectivity (what capabilities do they effectively 
afford to P?).  Hence the question is how to weigh the different functionings to which P gives 
value for himself. Even after selection of the functionings publicly relevant, weightings can be 
made along two metrics: that of P himself; that of the public external evaluator E. There are 
many reasons for divergence between P and E evaluations on the same situation. Some may 
be worthy, others not. A good reason is the inter-individual variability on the weights 
attributed to the same functionings. P values more reading at home than Q who is most 
motivated by working hard in his garden, for instance. If one takes for granted that these are 
two valuable functionings, such a subjective differentiation may be kept by the public 
evaluator in his evaluation. However, variability can be due to bad reasons. For instance, it is 
well-known that people in great difficulties or disarray under-estimates their poor conditions 
of life. Poor people have been accustomed to have less ambition than richer people, to work in 
tougher conditions, to be satisfied with less, etc. Social justice requires to correct this 
individual bias or neglect. In that case, it can be justified to give priority to objective external 
evaluation to the subjective one. 
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I have tried to sum up these rather hard points in Table 2. Table 2 differentiates the points of 
view of P, the person whose situation is evaluated and E the external investigator (the state or 
the researcher). It leads to four conceptions of social inquiry on capabilities. What is striking 
is that, in every social inquiry, both P and E have to occupy two different positions: that of an 
observer who empirically makes effort to produce objective information; that of an evaluator 
who, provided with a metrics of capabilities, tries to value the life led by P. Both P and E are 
facing difficult tasks: for P to be reflexive in observing his or her situation and in valuing it (a 
priori two different exercises); for E to be objective in externally observing the situation of P 
and in valuing it (also different exercises). Very often, this plurality of postures and their 
impact of the subsequent information produced in each case are neglected, which leads to 
methodological and political problems. 
 
Table 2. Four conceptions of social inquiry on people's capabilities 
 
 
Observer Evaluator 
 Individual P External Investigator E 
   
 
 
 
 
Individual P 
 
1 
 
 
Opinion poll 
on satisfaction 
(Eurobarometer) 
 
3 
 
 
External evaluation based on 
individual reports of personal 
experience 
(ECHP) 
 
   
 
 
 
 
External investigator 
E 
 
2 
 
 
External report based on 
individual evaluations 
(Schokkaert and Von 
Ostegem, 1990 ; Le Clainche, 
1994) 
 
 
4 
 
 
Objective evaluation based on 
external general standards 
(HDI at its beginning) 
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Table 2 tells us first that social facts are both descriptive and evaluative. One cannot hope to 
escape this fatality; better is to assume it. Though, at least at my knowledge, Sen has never 
been far away in inquiry issues, he seems to be aware of them (Sen, 1980, 1985a). For these 
reasons Sen let open the question of the right list of socially valuable functionings. Selecting 
the right list, if such a list exists, cannot belong to the researcher or the theorist. Ex ante 
scientific demonstration of its optimality is not a sufficient reason to a priori validate a 
normative model. The list is socially determined by the society and the historical period at 
stake. It depends of the conventions shared by the population under review. It needs to be 
collectively constructed. In other words, choice of a list is a “social choice” exercise; it has to 
be let to public deliberation. As Sen (1996: 117) underlines in relation to trade-offs between 
efficiency and equity: “These trade-offs are also part of public judgement, and what this 
exercise requires is not so much a cunning solution to reduce them into one dimension, but the 
identification of relevant considerations, suggesting particular proposals and encouraging 
public discussion on those considerations and proposals.”  
 
Scientists have to participate in this social choice exercise by bringing their own resources 
and arguments in equality with other actors, not by determining its outcome. This is debatable 
of course (see, for instance, the position of Martha Nussbaum, 2000). Table 2 suggests that 
there are four possibilities to build up information, from which existing efforts to make a 
capability approach operational can borrow. Table 2 is restricted to inquiries administered at 
distance. As they are lead in local agencies that receive potential recipients, face-to-face 
interviews pose additional issues: for instance the power unbalance between the officer and 
the interviewed person, the pressure exercised on answers by the fact the interviewed people 
needs help, and so on. 
 
In Method 1 (top left), the individual P is both her own observer and evaluator. Method 1 
leads to something like a poll survey which asks to individuals what opinions they have about 
their diverse conditions of life and work (are they excellent, good, passable, etc.). Such 
inquiry into satisfaction (think of Eurobarometer) will suffer from all the well-known 
problems of bias and entrenchment. In Method 4 (down right), the external investigator (the 
state or the theorist) is both the observer and the evaluator of the individual P. P is never given 
the floor. E has already elaborated a list of what he considers socially valuable functionings 
with scales of evaluation. He observes and measures the capabilities of P with the help of 
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these list and scales. Inter-individual variability of personal ends and weights attributed to 
functionings has disappeared. Externally, one decides what is good or bad for everybody. 
Whatever the theoretical foundations (philosophical, economical or political, …) of the 
chosen list and their disputability, Method 4 is exposed to the critics already made on ex ante 
determination. The poverty line approach (where inequality of capabilities is reduced to 
income inequality) is a very crude illustration of Method 4. One may wonder to what extent 
the fixation by the researcher before investigation, of a general and unique list of basic 
functionings (as used, for instance, in Robbeyns, 2003) escapes from such simplifications. 
The first and most simplistic versions of the HDI (Human Development Index) presumably 
suffered from the same problems. 
 
Methods 2 (down left) and 3 (top right) seem the most promising to capture capabilities. Both 
let room to externally controlled subjectivity (P is her own evaluator in 2, her own observer in 
3). In my view, illustrations of Method 2 are the works on unemployed people by Schokkaert 
and Van Ootegem (1990) and on excluded people by Le Clainche (1994). In each case, 
questionnaires are administered to individuals and answers capture personal evaluations of the 
life led. Factorial analysis (multiple correspondences) is used to aggregate inter-individual 
variability into a number of functionings, those which capture the maximum of variance. 
Functionings are not pre-fixed; they are generated through individual inquiry and analysis. 
Value is given to them by individual answers. For instance, Schokkaert and Van Ootegem 
(1990) found six factors, like social isolation, feeling happy, physical injury, to be able to plan 
his future. Method 3, by contrast, is using external valuation of functionings. This still 
requires a questionnaire administered to individuals, but with questions about facts inspiring 
objective answers. An illustration is the questionnaire of the ECHP (European Community 
Household Panel) which was using questions like this: “Does your employer provides free or 
subsidised services or benefits to employees in any of the following areas?: child-minding or 
crèche, health care or medical insurance, education and training, sports and leisure, holiday 
centre; free or subsidised housing”. As individual evaluation is also collected on the same 
items, ECHP was a very promising tool not only for objectively evaluating achieved 
functionings, but also for controlling the quality of subjective evaluations (Labbouz and 
Salais, 2003).  
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By necessity, my discussion has let aside many open methodological questions, not the least 
being the passage from evaluation of achieved functionings to effective freedom to achieve 
(hence a dynamic conception of capabilities). However this quick review of empirical works, 
trying to make a capability approach operational, helps to conclude to some optimism for 
future research, in particular on social exclusion issues. 
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